Disengagement

Less than three months after completion of the Israel's Disengagement from Gaza and Northern Samaria, the government of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon fell. Now, as Israelis consider their choices for the current election, the potential for future withdrawals is a major factor in how most Israelis will vote. Israelis are grappling with momentous decisions that will shape the future of the Jewish State. For over 35 years, since Israel's victory in the 1967 Six Day War, settlement activity in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza strip was supported by every Israeli government and were assumed by most (opponents and supporters alike) to be permanent features on the landscape of the Land of Israel. The Disengagement carried out by Ariel Sharon, the 'Grandfather of the Settlements' dramatically changed that reality and opened to door for further unilateral Israeli withdrawals in lieu of effective negotiations.

In August and September of 2005, Israel completed the historic step of fully withdrawing from the Gaza Strip and from a large area in Northern Samaria. The IDF quickly and professionally removed 8,000 Israelis, 25 settlements and the entire military presence from these areas with almost no violence and impressive efficiency. At the close of this era of Israeli settlement activity, there were high hopes held by many that this move would lead to peace, prosperity and the eventual creation of a peaceful and democratic Palestinian state.

Opponents of the Disengagement argued that withdrawing from these areas would be seen by many as a 'victory for terror' as Israel got no assurances that these areas would be terror free. Now, six months after the Disengagement, Hamas has won an impressive electoral victory, running partly on the slogan '10 years of negotiations got us nothing, 5 years of war got us Disengagement'.

It is widely assumed that the policy of unilateralism will be expanded to include communities throughout Judea and Samaria (the "West Bank"). The Kadima party, led by Sharon's successor Ehud Olmert, originally declared its intention to continue along the path of negotiations laid out in the Road Map peace plan, with the caveat that it was prepared to carry out further unilateral withdrawals if those negotiations prove fruitless. The Hamas victory appears to have increased the likelihood of further unilateral actions if indeed Kadima or a party further left of it wins the upcoming elections.

While Kadima has been purposely vague in its public statements regarding the full extent of its planned withdrawals, they have repeatedly stated that the major settlement blocks (Ariel, Maale Adumim and Gush Etzion) would permanently remain in Israeli hands. The Jordan Valley and areas around Hebron have also been mentioned as potentially being permanently retained by Israel. However, these plans would be carried out has yet to be discussed publicly.

Traditionally, left wing parties led by Meretz-Yahad have called for, and continue to support, the full Israeli withdrawal from all area acquired by Israel in the Six Day War, including parts of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. Kadima's positions seem more in-line with these left-wing views than they do with the views of their former brethren on the right who adamantly oppose further territorial concessions.

Supporters of the original Disengagement plan argued that it would save Israeli lives, create better strategic lines for Israeli forces, free up military and economic resources better spent elsewhere and improve Israel's diplomatic standing in the eyes of the international community.

Critics of the plan, and of further territorial concessions, not surprisingly argue the opposite. Given the Jewish people's historic claim to the land, many believe that Jews have the natural right to build communities throughout the Land of Israel. Others argue that unilateral withdrawal rewards Palestinian terrorists who have perpetrated over 20,000 attacks against Israelis within the past five plus years. Worse, it will inspire them to expand their scope of operations even further - perhaps to a level that could constitute a strategic threat to the Jewish State. Casualties suffered in future attacks will spur the Israel Defense Forces to act against the terrorist infrastructure - moves that call for additional military expenditures and will inevitably complicate Israel's public relations efforts.

While the Disengagement opened the door to future territorial withdrawals, whether they are the product of negotiations or of further unilateral moves, it remains to be seen how this will play out in the coming years. The Hamas victory and its unrepentant public pronouncements in the weeks since the election have brought great uncertainty to the picture and it remains to be seen if their ascension to power will serve a moderating force on their policies that call for the destruction of the State of Israel. If Hamas does indeed become more moderate, then the calls for negotiations and further withdrawals will again be heard from many in Israel. However, if Hamas continues on its path of violence and rejection of Israel the Israeli public will not likely be prepared to present them with another 'gift' in the form of additional territorial withdrawals.